Publication

Growing Chinese Presence in Nicaragua, the “Donroe Doctrine,” and Investment Treaty Protection

November 18, 2026

Key Takeaways:

  • Growing Chinese investment in Nicaragua’s mining sector meets the current U.S. administration’s assertion of a policy of hemispheric control. Nicaragua has granted Chinese companies 80 mining concessions covering roughly 11% of its territory, at a time when the U.S. administration seeks to keep non-hemispheric competitors from controlling strategic assets in the region.
  • U.S. pressure would not operate in a legal vacuum. The China-Nicaragua FTA protects Chinese investors against discriminatory expropriation and gives them access to international arbitration.
  • Outside pressure would also give Nicaragua defenses. The FTA’s self-judging essential security clause and customary defenses such as necessity and force majeure could apply to measures adopted under external coercion.
  • Western mining companies face opportunities and risks. Any reallocation of Chinese-held areas could open new opportunities for them, but careful due diligence and investment structuring are key.

The Financial Times recently reported that, over the past three years, Nicaragua has granted 80 mining concessions to Chinese companies, covering roughly 11% of its national territory. The licenses are not limited to specific minerals, but gold is a key focus. China sees gold as “highly strategic because of its role as a central bank reserve asset” and has been actively acquiring gold assets abroad. Nicaragua is an attractive destination: gold accounts for more than a fifth of its exports, and the country is estimated to hold about 250 tonnes of gold resources.[1]

This growing Chinese presence in Nicaragua comes as the current U.S. administration pursues a policy of hemispheric control. The press calls it the “Donroe Doctrine” (or the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine), and its stated aim is to prevent competitors from outside the hemisphere, mainly China, from owning or controlling strategic assets in the Western Hemisphere. Recent developments in Venezuela illustrate how this policy has been applied. In August 2026, oilfields previously operated by Chinese and Russian companies were transferred to a U.S.-backed operator. The White House linked this step to the Monroe Doctrine, “ensuring American dominance in our hemisphere is never again questioned.”[2] China responded that its rights must be “protected by international law.”[3]

How could the “Donroe Doctrine” play out in Nicaragua?

Asked by the Financial Times about the Chinese concessions, a U.S. State Department spokesperson said that the Department closely monitors Chinese activity in Nicaragua, including in mining, and that the administration’s strategy “makes clear we will deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to gain footholds or control strategic assets in our region.”[4] This raises a question of growing practical relevance: what would happen, as a matter of international law, if the current U.S. administration were to press Nicaragua to revoke or materially change the mining rights held by Chinese investors? Such a step could have significant legal consequences. The same questions could arise in other States in the hemisphere that have received substantial Chinese investment over the past decade, many of which have treaties with China that protect those investments.

The applicable framework is Chapter 11 of the China-Nicaragua Free Trade Agreement. Under Article 11.6, expropriations must be carried out in a non-discriminatory manner. Revoking licenses because the holders are Chinese could be challenged as discriminatory. In addition, Section B of Chapter 11 contains Nicaragua’s consent to investor-State arbitration under the ICSID Convention, the ICSID Additional Facility Rules or the UNCITRAL Rules. Affected Chinese investors could therefore bring claims before an international tribunal.

The financial stakes could be substantial. The Financial Times reports that most individual concessions are held by small and medium-sized companies,[5] but the concessions together cover about 11% of Nicaragua’s territory and are not limited to any specific mineral. Each claim may be modest, but taken together they could add up to a large exposure, especially once the presence of gold or other valuable minerals in economically mineable quantities is established. That said, the rights granted by Nicaragua cover exploration and development,[6] and many projects may still be at an early exploratory stage. This could raise valuation complexities common in mining disputes: exploration-stage projects typically lack established viability, so they cannot reliably be valued on projected income, but rather through market- or cost-based methods, which generally produce lower values.

The host State would also have potential defenses, particularly if measures were taken because of outside pressure.

Article 19.3 of the FTA, which applies to Chapter 11’s investment protections, preserves each Party’s right to take measures “it considers necessary” to protect its essential security interests, including action taken “in time of war or other emergency in international relations.” Because the clause is self-judging and turns on what the Party itself “considers necessary,” it could give the host State a basis to resist claims premised on measures adopted in response to outside pressure.

Customary international law offers further potential defenses. One is “necessity” under Article 25 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. The host State would need to show that an “essential interest” was threatened by a “grave and imminent peril,” that the challenged measures were the “only means” to protect that interest, that the measures did not “seriously impair an essential interest” of the State to which the obligation is owed (here, China), and that Nicaragua had not contributed to the situation.[7] Another is “force majeure” under ILC Article 23.[8] Leading commentary recognizes that ILC Article 23 may cover “certain situations of duress and coercion involving force imposed on the State.”[9] Even if these customary defenses succeeded, ILC Article 27 leaves open whether the host State would nonetheless owe “compensation for any material loss caused by” the challenged measures.[10]

A tribunal under the FTA could decide these defenses even without the United States as a party, because it would need only to make findings of fact about U.S. conduct, not rule on its lawfulness.[11] The United States, by contrast, would be difficult to reach directly: it has no investment treaty in force with China and is not party to the China-Nicaragua FTA.

Implications for Western Mining Companies

A potential scenario in which current Chinese operators are displaced could create openings for American and other Western companies, as happened in Venezuela. The commercial opportunities would be significant, but so would the legal risks. If claims from Chinese investors materialize, any resulting liability for Nicaragua could destabilize new agreements. For example, current investors could seek interim measures that could complicate operations, or try to enforce awards against royalties and tax payments owed by new Western operators. They could also seek restitution, which is rare but not unheard of in investor-State arbitration. Tortious interference claims in domestic courts are also possible.

Western companies offered areas previously held by Chinese concession holders should therefore carry out careful due diligence first. They should document how the areas became available, who held them before, and how close the prior holder was to production. The closer a project was to production, the stronger the displaced investor’s incentive to litigate. Western investors should also check whether their own home State has an investment treaty with Nicaragua, which may protect their new investments.

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For guidance on investment treaty protection and mining-sector disputes in Latin America, please contact Foley Hoag’s International Litigation and Arbitration Department.


1Financial Times, Gold-rich Nicaragua hands Chinese miners rights to a tenth of its land (26 Sept. 2026).

2The White House, “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Announces Historic Oil Agreement to Secure American Energy Dominance and Drive Venezuela’s Economic Recovery” (31 Aug. 2026), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/08/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-announces-historic-oil-agreement-to-secure-american-energy-dominance-and-drive-venezuelas-economic-recovery/.

3R. Vaz, “China Demands Respect for Venezuela Investments amid Oilfield Transfers to US-Controlled Operator,” Venezuelanalysis (1 Sept. 2026), available at https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/china-demands-respect-for-venezuela-investments-amid-oilfield-transfers-to-us-controlled-operator/.

4Financial Times, Gold-rich Nicaragua hands Chinese miners rights to a tenth of its land (26 Sept. 2026).

5Financial Times, Gold-rich Nicaragua hands Chinese miners rights to a tenth of its land (26 Sept. 2026).

6Financial Times, Gold-rich Nicaragua hands Chinese miners rights to a tenth of its land (26 Sept. 2026).

7International Law Commission, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), Article 25.

8International Law Commission, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), Article 23.

9J. Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility. Introduction, Text and Commentaries (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 170-171.

10International Law Commission, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), Article 27(b) (“The invocation of a circumstance precluding wrongfulness in accordance with this chapter is without prejudice to … (b) the question of compensation for any material loss caused by the act in question.”).

11See Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1954, p. 32 (explaining that the Court may not exercise jurisdiction where the legal interest of an absent third State “would not only be affected by a decision, but would form the very subject-matter of the decision.”).

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